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I. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW
A. Regulation of Imports and Exports
COUNTERVAILING DUTY - TREASURY PRACTICE OF
NOT COUNTERVAILING THE NONEXCESSIVE REM-
ISSION OF INDIRECT TAXES IS A LAWFULLY PER-
MISSIBLE INTERPRETATION OF THE U.S. COUN-
TERVAILING DUTY LAW, § 303 OF THE TARIFF ACT
OF 1930, AS AMENDED.
Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443 (1978).
On April 3, 1970, Zenith Radio Corporation' filed a petition 2 with the
Commissioner of Customs 3 alleging that the government of Japan paid or
bestowed bounties or grants directly or indirectly, upon the manufacture
or production of certain consumer electronic products from that country. 4
Included among the alleged bounties or grants was the "forgiveness"5 by
the Japanese of a commodity tax upon the exportation of such products
from Japan.6
1. Zenith Radio Corporation is a U.S. corporation engaged in the manufac-
ture of various consumer electronic products including the following: television
receivers, radio receivers, radio-phonograph-television combinations, record
players and phonographs complete with amplifiers and speakers, tape recorders
and color television picture tubes.
2. The petition was filed pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1303, § 303 Tariff Act of 1930,
as amended [hereinafter cited as 1930 Tariff Act].
3. Although section 303 of the 1930 Tariff Act imposes the burden of making
countervailing duty determinations upon the Secretary of the Treasury, regula-
tions in 19 CFR § 16.24(b) (1970) (now 19 CFR § 159.47(b) (1976)), require
communication with the Commissioner of Customs.
4. The products include: television receivers, radio receivers, radio-
phonograph-television combinations, radio-tape recorder combinations, tape
players, tape recorders, record players and phonographs complete with amplifiers
and speakers, and parts of television receivers: color picture tubes, resisters and
tuners. 37 Fed. Reg. 10,087 (1972), as amended 37 Fed. Reg. 11,487 (1972).
5. Japanese Commodity Tax Law, March 31, 1962, Law No. 48, as revised.
6. The term "forgiveness" was used by Zenith in its appelate briefs. This term
encompasses both the remission of taxes already paid and the exemption from
taxation when goods are exported. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and
the Supreme Court chose to use the word "remission" to describe this same
phenomenon. That word will hereinafter be implemented.
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On January 7, 19767 a "Final Negative Countervailing Duty
Determination" in the case of "Certain Consumer Electronic Products
from Japan," issued by the Acting Commsioner of Customs and approved
by the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, was published in the
Federal Register." Zenith then filed timely notice of its desire to contest
the Secretary's negative determination. 9 Zenith filed the complaint in
Customs Court on April 12, 1976, and the Court assigned a three-judge
panel to hear the case. 10 The sole issue facing the Customs Court was
whether the remission of the Japanese commodity tax constituted a
bounty or grant under the U.S. countervailing duty statute."
In separate but concurring opinions the three-judge Customs Court
granted Zenith's motion for summary judgment having determined that
the remission of the tax constituted the conferring of a "bounty of
grant."'1 2 On appeal the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed. 13
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and subsequently affirmed the
CCPA's decision unanimously. 4
The High Court's reasoning was rather simple. The countervailing
duty law currently in force is, in all relevant aspects, unchanged from the
countervailing duty statute enacted by Congress in 1877.15 In 1898 the
Treasury Department determined that the statute did not require
7. As of January 3, 1975, the date of the enactment of the Trade Act of 1974, 5
U.S.C. §§5312, 5314-16, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160 et seq. (1976), the Treasury Department
had still not rendered a decision in this matter. Section 331(a) of the Trade Act
amended the countervailing duty statute to, among other things, require that the
Secretary of the Treasury make a final determination within twelve months of the
date on which a petition is filed. Section 331(d)(2) of the Trade Act provided, in
effect, that with respect to investigations in progress on the date of enactment of
the Trade Act, a final determination would have to be made wphin twelve months
of the day after the date of enactment.
8. This determination stated that "a final determination is hereby made in
this proceeding, that ... no bounty or grant is being paid or bestowed, directly or
indirectly, within the meaning of section 303, Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19
U.S.C. § 1303), upon the manufacturer [sic], production, or exportation of certain
consumer electronic products from Japan." 41 Fed. Reg. 1298 (1976).
9. Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1516(d) any domestic manufacturer of merchandise
of the same class or kind as the merchandise which was the subject of the
Secretary's decision, may, within 30 days, file notice of its desire to contest the
negative decision.
10. Three-judge panels are only selected for cases which are deemed to be of
special significance. 28 U.S.C. 225(a) (1976).
11. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976).
12. 430 F. Supp. 242 (Cust. Ct. 1977).
13. The reversal came in a 3-2 decision with both sides putting forth extensive
and forceful arguments, 562 F.2d 1209 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
14. 437 U.S. 443 (1978).
15. Id. at 448.
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countervailance of nonexcessive remissions of indirect taxes.16 Neither
Congress nor the Supreme Court has spoken definitely with respect to
that point up to the present time. Consequently, that interpretation is as
valid today as it was in 1898.17
Zenith provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to review the
eighty-year old interpretation of the U.S. countervailing duty law in light
of the tremendous changes which have taken place in the world's tax
systems. I8 Unfortunately the Court's decision provides little in the way of
critical reevaluation. Even more importantly the decision renders
American businesses more vulnerable both at home and abroad.
The Court has caused problems of immediate significance by its use
of the term "indirect" when referring to taxes.19 The Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals carefully limited its discussion to excise taxes.2° The
proper treatment to be afforded that particular type of tax was the issue
raised by the facts in Zenith and the CCPA restricted its holding
accordingly. To understand the problem created by the Court's treatment
of the term "indirect" it is necessary to examine the word's origin and the
significance which it carries in the context of international trade.
The phrase "indirect tax" is believed to be as old as taxation itself. By
the eighteenth century some economists believed that all taxes could be
divided into two groups - indirect and direct. The key distinction to be
made was who bore the ultimate burden of a particular tax. If the person
rendering the payment also bore the burden, the tax was considered
direct. If the person rendering payment passed the burden on to at least
one person the tax was considered indirect.21
16. Id. at 450.
17. Id. at 457.
18. In the United States, for example, customs and excise taxes, which have
traditionally been classified as indirect taxes, made up 79.1% of the Federal
Revenue in 1898. In 1976 they only accounted for 7.7%. Similar, though perhaps
less dramatic, changes have occurred in other developed countries. Source for U.S.
statistics: U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, Table Series Y, 567-89 and 1121 (1976) and U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, Table
10.407, 268 (1977).
19. The court used the term eighteen times in its opinion, often without
clarification, examples or references to the case at bar.
20. 562 F.2d at 1212. The court there further specified that at times the parties
had referred to it as a "commodity" and "consumption" tax as well as an "excise"
tax. Id. n.7.
21. "[Tlaxes are either direct or indirect. A direct tax is one which is demanded
from the very persons, who it is intended or desired, should pay it. Indirect taxes
are those which are demanded from one person in the expectation that he shall
indemnify hiqiself at the expense of another, such as the excise or customs." J.
MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 823 (P. Ashley ed. 1936).
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Relying on this deceptively simple distinction governments began
giving different treatment to the two categories of taxes in the area of
countervailing duties. While most states felt that domestic policies which
gave an unfair impetus to exportation caused an improper distortion of
international trade, the remission by the government of indirect taxes
upon the exportation of domestically-produced goods, was considered a
permissible and non-distorting practice.
The United States formally embraced this philosophy in 1898.22 The
theory underlying this practice, which Marshall found "intuitively
appealing," maintained that each country should only collect those
indirect taxes which arose from purchases made within that country. A
minor flaw in the theory as it applies to modern conditions results from
the development of new and very complex methods of assessing taxes.
These developments have caused the once easy-to-draw line between
direct and indirect2 3 to become blurred. The more serious flaw is found in
the theory's inability to recognize the fact that a portion of a direct tax
burden may be passed on to consumers, while some indirect taxes may
just as easily be absorbed by a manufacturer or middleman.24
The global importance of this archaic theory remains quite substan-
tial even in today's international marketplace. The theory was solidified
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAT'f)25 and has been
vigorously defended up to the present time. In the United States, the
Treasury Department relies on this theory in making its decision of
whether or not to countervail against remitted taxes in the entire
decision. The attempt is contained in the second paragraph of the opinion
where Justice Marshall said for the Court, "[T]he electronic products at
issue here, are subject to an "indirect" tax - a tax levied on the goods
themselves and computed as a percentage of the manufacturer's sale price
rather than the income or wealth of the purchaser or seller." 26
22. See T.D. 19321, 1. TREAS. DEC. 696, (1898); T.D. 19729, 2 TREAS DEC. 157,
(1898); T.D. 20407, 2 TREAS. DEC. 996, (1898).
23. Since the turn of the century no fewer than twenty-seven different methods
of calculating and assessing taxes have been introduced. One of the most
complicated which is currently being scrutinized by the Treasury Department is
the Cascade turnover tax. See Treasury May Reverse Stance on Countervailing
Duties, J. of Com., Dec. 5, 1978, at 3, col. 4.
24. The occurrence of such shifting is supported by what some have
characterized as an empirical view of the marketplace. See comment, The Steel
Products Decision: An Inquiry into the Treatment of the Value-Added Tax Under
the Countervailing Duty Law. 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 842 (1976).
25. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A 3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter cited as GAIT).
26. 437 U.S. at 446.
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This quasi-definition is susceptible to only two interpretations. First,
indirect taxes must be computed as a percentage of the manufacturer's
sales price (hereinafter referred to as type A taxes). Second, indirect taxes
are all those taxes which are not computed as a percentage of the
purchaser's or seller's income (hereinafter referred to as tupe B taxes).
The former definition is unacceptable because it would exclude a host of
taxes which are universally considered to be indirect. Included in this
group would be those computed on a per-unit basis such as liquor taxes
and those computed as a percentage of the retail price as retail sales
taxes.
It follows, therefore, that the definition intended by the Court was the
latter alternative. The Court has created a serious problem, however, by,
in effect, stating that all taxes which are not type A are therefore indirect.
Given this new system of tax treatment, foreign governments need only
style their taxes so as to fall outside of type A. In so doing the
governments can attempt to insure that their taxes are deemed to be
indirect.
The High Court's quasi-definition greatly expands the field of taxes
which may be classified "indirect." If the Treasury Department chooses
to agree with this expansion it can abstain from imposing countervailing
duties for the remission of many taxes by foreign countries who are
exporting goods to the United States.
The Court compounded this problem by refusing to seriously discuss
the questions of interpretation and application which currently arise so
as to provide some guidance for future judicial decisions. 27 The failure to
address these questions is perhaps the greatest shortcoming of the
decision for the Supreme Court is the body which is charged with putting
ambiguous wording into concrete form while at the same time determin-
ing the role which specific legislation is to play within the U.S. judicial
system.
At first glance the Court's decision appears to be merely a vote of
support for the Treasury's policy. On a second level the decision
represents an abdication of judicial authority to review a substantial
portion of the Secretary's activities. This may spcceed in giving the
executive branch "a more effective weapon in'trade negotiations,"
however, the immediate effects could well be manifested in an undermin-
27. Zenith was the first domestic manufacturer to protest a "negative
determination" pursuant to the amendments contained in the 1974 Trade Act. (See
supra note 9). Other business concerns followed and it can be expected that many
more contests will ensue in the future when U.S. businesses disagree with
Treasury's findings.
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ing of the countervailing duty law's ability to protect domestic indus-
tries.2
8
With this decision the judiciary has become the second branch of the
federal government to abdicate its responsibility. Congress has pursued a
"hands-off" policy with respect to the key terms of the countervailing
duty law for over twenty-five years.
29
United States manufacturers are experiencing critical problems
competing in the international market. The differential treatment goods
receive as a result of differing tax programs may have a strong influence
on these problems. 3° The United States enacted a countervailing duty law
because it was aware that some governments would be willing to sacrifice
revenues in return for increased employment and growth of domestic
industries. That willingness is as strong today as it was in 1897.31 The
techniques used by foreign governments to carry out this policy have
become more sophisticated. Restructuring and redefining taxes so that
they could be classified as "indirect" and qualified for remission upon
exportation is one such technique. This method has an added advantage
in that not only do goods flow from the country with a decreased tax
burden but goods which U.S. exporters attempt to ship into that country
face an increased border tax adjustment due to the higher "indirect"
taxes. That nation's manufacturers are thus twice blessed.
3 2
28. Decisions of the Secretary will still be subject to judicial review in the
Customs Court, and the findings must be supported by substantial evidence.
Energetic Worsted Corp. v. United States, 53 C.C.P.A. 36 (1966). However in the
wake of the Zenith decision the Secretary will be able to argue more easily that a
given tax falls within the Supreme Court's broad definition of indirect. One
commentator has contended that a stronger challenge may be mounted against a
Treasury decision because of the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.
See Butler, Countervailing Duties and Export Subsidization: Re-emerging Issue in
International Trade. 9 VA. J. INT'L. L. 82, 102 (1968) (hereinafter cited as Butler).
29. In 1950 a bill was drafted which would have codified Treasury's practice
by amending the U.S. law to preclude countervailence of nonexcessive remissions
of indirect taxes. That bill was not enacted into law. See Hearings on H.R. 5505
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 115, 124-125 (1952).
Since that time the issue was raised on four other occasions all with the same
result - no change in the basic terms of the law. In preparing the Trade Act of
1974 Congress considered one amendment which would have effectively counter-
manded Treasury's practice and another designed to codify that practice. Congress
refused to enact either provision. See Hearings on H.R. 6767 Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2169-71, 2496-500, 3097, 3814-15
and 2244-46, 2419, 2421, 5126-30 (1973).
30. Butler, supra note 28, at 112.
31. See O'Neill, United States Countervailing Duty Law: Renewed, Revamped
and Revisited Trade Act of 1974, 17 B.C. IND. & COM. L.R. 832 (1976).
32. It was thought at one time that the effects of such differential tax policies
were offset by changes in exchange rates and price levels within individual
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To date the United States has not followed the majority of the
developed nations in shifting its dependence to excise and value-added as
opposed to income taxes. Such a change, however, has not been without
support.3 3 In the wake of Zenith, U.S. policy makers must squarely face
the problems caused by the existence of different tax systems in the world
marketplace. Had the Customs Court decision been affirmed, reaction on
the part of Congress would have been swift. But because the Supreme
Court has reestablished the longstanding practice there is a danger that
the legislature might return to its semi-conscious state. Moreover, even if
several members of Congress to decide to try to amend the countervailing
duty law, the legislative process is always long and often uncertain.
Several avenues still remain open for the Secretary of the Treasury,
should be decide to move against certain tax remissions by foreign
exporting nations. In Zenith the Court held only that the Secretary's
policy was a reasonable one, not that it was the only reasonable one.
Consequently the Secretary is free to discard the historical distinction
between direct and indirect taxes. There is certainly enough support for
this change in policy from leading economists on both sides of the
Atlantic. 34 Support can also be drawn from a more careful analysis of the
effects which taxes of whatever stripe have on profits and thus on the
flow of investment capital in the world marketplace. The archaic concept
of consciously "shifting a tax" or not "shifting a tax" is only workable in
situations involving a monopoly. Where competition exists the price
which one may charge is determined by market forces. The extent to
which a seller can "shift" the cost incurred in paying a tax depends
entirely on the strength of that seller in the marketplace and not on the
countries. Two problems exist with this principle: first, these adjustments in
exchange rates and price levels occur very slowly; and second, these adjustments
only restore the original compartive advantage when the domestic indirect tax rate
is applied uniformly to all products. When there is uneven application then goods
which are taxed more heavily at home than others still benefit from a remission
upon exportation. See Butler, supra note 28, at 114 and Destination Principle
Border Tax Adjustments for the Corporate Income and Social Security Taxes
prepared by the Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Treasury Department (December,
1976).
33. Former Secretary of the Treasury, Connally, spoke quite clearly on this
subject when he said: "[T]he time has come for us to either demand the same
treatment for direct taxes, or to play their game and insist that their value-added
tax be treated the same as our direct taxes or that in any future tax measures, that
we consider the possibility of adopting the value-added tax." Hearings of
Subcommittee on International Trade of the Senate Committee on Finance, 92d
Congress, 1st Sess. 45 (1971).
34. The Supreme Court gave token recognition to this body of opinion. 437
U.S. at 459.
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nature of the tax itself. Thus, it is unimportant whether a manufacturer is
assessed a profits tax or an excise tax. The manufacturer will still
demand the highest price he can obtain. What is important, however, is
the treatment which nations give to those two types of taxes in the area of
international trade.
If, for various reasons, one nation favors excise taxes and another
profits taxes and neither country remits taxes upon the exportation of
taxed goods then neither country will have given its manufacturers an
advantage. If, however, one nation remits all excise taxes when a
domestic manufacturer's goods are exported and the importing nation
does not impose an equivalent or higher excise tax, then that manufac-
turer will obtain a higher profit than it would have otherwise. Moreover,
if the nation which favors profits taxes is not allowed to remit taxes upon
exportation of goods and importing nations still impose their local excise
taxes then the manufacturer will make less profit. This is the way U.S.
manufacturers are currently being detrimentally affected by world tax
policies.
The U.S. government has decided to impose a much higher profits tax
on corporations and a much lower excise and value-added tax burden
than most other developed nations. 35 Global policy currently permits
remission of the latter two taxes but not of the former.36 Foreign goods
flow into the United States minus their excise and value-added tax
burden but are not met with equivalent American-imposed burdens.
Consequently profits are higher for those manufacturers. Similarly, U.S.
goods flow from the United States still carrying their considerable profits
tax burden and then are met with further impediments in the form of
foreign excise and value-added taxes.37 Obviously, profits are lower for
those manufacturers.
The solution to this problem is that no taxes should be remitted. If the
underlying theory for remitting consumption taxes was based on the
belief that such taxes should only be exacted once, then a new definition
of consumption tax is needed. That definition which is easiest to apply
would only include those taxes imposed and paid at the point of
consumption. That is the only tax which is clearly and entirely paid by
35. See S. CNOSSEN, EXCISE SYSTEMS: A GLOBAL STUDY OF THE SELECTIVE
TAXATION OF GOODS AND SERVICES (1977); Butler, supra note 28, at 112.
36. The practice is embodied in the GATT (art. V) and followed by all of the
developed nations.
37. See Feller, Mutiny Against the Bounty: An Examination of Subsidies,
Border Tax Adjustments, and the Resurgence of the Countervailing Duty Law, 1
LAw & POL. INT'L. Bus. 17 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Feller]. See also Butler,
supra note 28, at 112.
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the consumer. All other taxes - excise, value-added, profits, and others,
may ultimately be paid in whole or in part by the consumer but it is
impossible to ascertain the extent to which that occurs in any given
transaction. Therefore, to arbitrarily remit all of one type of tax and none
of another unfairly prejudices manufacturers in one system and benefits
those in another.
Should the Treasury Department decide to scrap the traditional
distinction between direct and indirect taxes, decisions to countervail
instances of tax remission could be made on a principled basis by looking
to the specific intent of the countervailing duty law. 38 Other GATT
participants as well as non-GATT trading partners might well react
adversely to such a shift in policy. 39 The Secretary is not, however,
restricted by the GATT rules on countervailing duties 4° and the terms of
the U.S. countervailing duty law are certainly broad enough to permit
such action.4 1 Such a policy would have the added advantage of
permitting the executive branch to grant special treatment for lesser
developed countries on a case-by-case basis. 42
A second approach which the Secretary has available is to treat both
income and commodity taxes as though they were passed on to the
38. That is, decisions to countervail should be made so as to further the
purpose of the law. For a discussion of this approach to enforcement of the
countervailing duty law see Note, United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 13 Tax.
INT'L. L. J. 95, 107-11 (1978).
39. In fact the Supreme Court based its decision in part upon a perceived need
for the United States to refrain from upsetting other nations' "reliance interests."
437 U.S. at 457. If the Treasury Department's interpretation of the law is improper,
any such reliance interests are not entitled to protection. See Note, The
Countervailing Duty Law after Zenith: Unanimity Can be Beguiling, 18 VA. J.
INT'L L. 245, 265-67 (1978). In any event analysis of other nations' reliance is
irrelevant when attempting to ascertain the correct interpretation which U.S.
courts should grant a piece of U.S. legislation.
40. Under the terms of the protocol by which the United States ratified the
GATT, all preexisting U.S. laws were to remain in effect. This "grandfather"
clause allows the United States to apply its much stricter countervailing duty
provisions despite its status as a GATT trading partner. See Protocol of
Provisional Application of the GATT, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A2051, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308.
41. As the Supreme Court noted in Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 249 U.S.
34 (1919), "If the word 'bounty' has a limited sense the word 'grant' has not. A
word of broader significance than 'grant' could not have been used." Id. at 39.
42. Such flexibility has been asked for by South American commentators. See
Smith, Export Subsidies of the Carribbean Basin and a Proposed Revision of
International Rules Regarding Countervailing Duties, 4 INT'L. TRADE L. J. 124
(1978).
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consumer and compute a tax burden for every item that is produced. 43
Thus imports would be met with a border tax adjustment which reflected
U.S. excise and income taxes. At the same time U.S. exports would be
exempted from both types of taxes. Such a plan would be hailed by
American manufacturers despite the complexity of the mathematical
formulations. The reception abroad would of course, be less enthusiastic.
The Secretary could also pursue a more aggressive policy of
questioning not only the amount of money a country is remitting but also
the exact nature of each tax, payment of which is remitted upon
exportation.44
Whatever course the Secretary chooses, long-term solutions can only
result from international dialogue and agreement. Perhaps by adopting a
more forceful policy now, the United States can hasten the arrival of that
occasion.
Joseph Murphy Bracken
43. As mentioned supra note 24, this position is defensible under modem
economic theory.
44. This is precisely the type of inquiry which resulted in the decision to
countervail American Express Co. v. United States, 472 F.2d 1050 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
The driving force behind the Treasury investigation was a very concerned United
States steel producers organization.
